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ABSTRACT 
 
We analyse the relationship between board structure and firm performance in family-
controlled firms, using a sample of Indonesian non-financial companies. We find that 
the share of independent directors on the board has an insignificant relationship with 
firm performance. We suspect that the result is driven by the lack of institutional 
reforms in relation to the appointment of independent directors. Our analysis shows 
strong empirical support for the proposition that family control (family ownership and 
family involvement on the board) is negatively related to firm performance. However, 
the significant effect of family ownership disappears when family involvement on the 
board is taken into the model. This result indicates that family ownership is more 
detrimental to firm performance whenever the family is highly involved in control 
decisions. Our results suggest that Indonesia needs to implement governance reforms 
that prevent majority owners from exercising excessive control over firms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A study by the World Bank (2005) has indicated poor implementation of institutional 
reform in Indonesia with adverse implications for corporate governance. Global trends 
in corporate governance reform have emphasised board independence. This trend is 
grounded in the agency framework, which claims that a more independent board tends to 
make better decisions (Dahya and McConnel 2005). Many countries have taken heed of 
the call for more independent directors, assuming that this will lead to better decisions 
and greater investor protection. In 2001, Indonesia required that listed firms’ boards 
comprise at least 30 per cent independent directors, or that the number of independent 
directors be proportional to the shareholding by minority investors, whichever is higher. 
This requirement does not regulate the board leadership structure as Indonesia has 
officially adopted a two-tier board system. 
In most developing economies, firm ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few 
wealthy families (Lemmon and Lins 2003). Morck and Yeung (2003) argue that the 
management of family-controlled firms, acting solely for the controlling family, 
potentially worsens the agency problem. The main agency problem is related to the 
conflict between the controlling family and minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). 
In this study of family-controlled firms, we examine the relationship between the 
representation of independent directors, controlling family ownership, controlling family 
involvement on the board of directors, and firm performance. The study contributes to 
the governance literature in several ways. First, we disentangle the impact of family 
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ownership and family involvement in boards on the performance of firms—an issue that 
has not been addressed in most studies of firms under family-control. 
Second, we focus on Indonesia. Although the association between the board of directors 
and firm performance has received considerable attention, most such studies have 
focused on the US, which it is claimed has strong legal protection, dispersed ownership, 
active institutional investors, and a large, deep and active market (Erickson et al. 2005; 
La Porta et al. 1999). In contrast, Indonesia has been documented as having a weak legal 
system, ownership concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy families, and a less 
developed market for corporate control (Beck et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 1998). 
Matolcsy et al. (2004) believe that departure from the US setting has a significant 
impact on the firm-level governance structure, its effectiveness, and firm value. 
Accordingly, we examine the effectiveness of firm-level governance mechanisms in 
Indonesia. Third, we control for endogeneity and non-linearity issues, which are ignored 
in most empirical studies investigating the impact of board structure. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the research 
issues and questions. Section 3 describes research method. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical tests and the robustness of the results. Section 5 discusses the results, the 
policy implications, and the limitations of the study. Section 6 provides the conclusion. 
2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
Agency theory contends that use of outside directors enhances board independence and, 
ultimately, firm performance (Fama and Jensen 1983). Peng et al (2003) argue that the 
underlying assumptions of agency theory have been claimed as universally applicable 
and therefore the advantages and the disadvantages of independent directors are relevant 
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to all economies. However, the empirical literature fails to produce conclusive findings. 
For example, Hutchinson and Gul (2004) find a positive relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors and firm performance, while Lawrence and 
Stapledon (1999) find a negative relationship. Arguably, such a finding might be 
attributed to the existence of interdependence relationships among governance 
mechanisms (Radiker and Seth 1995). Interdependence implies that the importance of 
the board as a monitoring device depends on the presence of other strong monitoring 
devices. 
A study by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found that board monitoring is less important 
in the presence of the multiplicity of control mechanisms in the US, which has a strong 
institutional environment. It has been argued that this setting enhances the effectiveness 
of both internal and external governance mechanisms in reducing the self-interested 
behaviour of agents (Erickson et al. 2005). By contrast, Indonesia has been characterised 
as having a weak institutional environment (Patrick 2001), where poor legal 
enforcement and the absence of a market for corporate control have been claimed as 
facilitating controlling owners in diverting firm resources (Krishnamurti et al. 2005). 
Scott (1999) argues that in such an environment, the strengthening of internal 
governance mechanisms will create immediate benefits, while benefits from the 
development of markets for corporate control can be expected to emerge in the long 
term. Although the theoretical basis for this view is limited, it implies that it would be 
beneficial to enhance board independence in order to compensate for the absence of 
external governance mechanisms. Accordingly, board monitoring should be very 
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important in Indonesia, where there is an absence of control mechanisms. Thus, we 
expect that independent directorship is positively related to firm performance. 
Similar to other Asian countries, the ownership of Indonesian-listed firms is 
concentrated in the hands of a few families (Claessens et al. 2000). Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) argue that the presence of large shareholders might serve as a governance 
mechanism as their significant ownership provides them with the incentive to monitor 
management and sufficient voting power to replace badly-performing managers. 
However, a high level of stockholding also provides large shareholders with control over 
the firm’s decisions, which enables them to deprive minority shareholders of their rights 
(La Porta et al. 2000). 
Although the disadvantage of controlling shareholders might be mitigated by the 
presence of unrelated block holders, Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Faccio et al (2001) 
argue that block holders in Asian economies are more likely to collude with controlling 
shareholders to divert firm resources. This view suggests that the negative effect of the 
controlling family in Asia applies irrespective of the presence of other governance 
mechanisms. Therefore, we expect that ownership concentration by a controlling family 
is negatively related to firm performance. 
It has been argued that the prevalence of family control provides a rationale for using the 
family, instead of individuals, as the unit of analysis, as the family members of the 
controlling owners share the same interests and will pursue similar behaviour in the 
contracting environment. Claessens et al (2002), for example, argue that using the 
family as the unit of analysis is useful as this approach better portrays the real control of 
the firm. One implication of family members sharing the same interests is that family 
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ownership includes shareholdings by both family members and by parties considered to 
be under the influence of the family (Villalonga  Amit 2006). Put differently, the 
aggregate shareholdings of family members of the controlling owner are treated 
identically to the shareholding of a single person in the framework where individuals 
serve as the unit of analysis. Although this approach lacks theoretical support, there is a 
significant incidence of governance research taking this approach (for example, Ehrhardt 
and Nowak 2001; Mitton 2004). 
An important issue related to the prevalence of ownership concentration is family 
involvement in the board of directors (Tabalujan 2002). Specifically, control of the firm 
is enhanced through the appointment of family members to serve on the board of 
directors. The interest-sharing argument suggests that the family members of controlling 
owners serving on the board represent the interest of their family. Therefore, it might be 
argued that the family members of controlling owners serving on the board might be 
sharing the same interests with management that has been claimed as acting solely for 
the controlling family (Morck and Yeung 2003). This line of reasoning implies that the 
directors among controlling family members could have identical interests to the 
executive directors. As the controlling family owns a substantial shareholding of the 
firm, the family members of controlling owners serving on the boards might raise the 
type of insider-ownership problem advanced by Morck et al (1988). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that higher levels of ownership potentially lessen the 
incentive of insiders to pursue self-interested action, as their wealth is sensitive to 
organisational outcome. Therefore, higher insider ownership enhances the convergence 
of interests of insiders and outside shareholders. However, Nam (2003:2) suggests that 
  
Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 
ANU College of Asia & the Pacific                                          
The Australian National University                                         
JG Crawford Building No. 13                                                  
Canberra ACT 0200 Australia   
T:  +61 2 6125 0407      
F:  +61 2 6125 8448 
E:   apel@anu.edu.au 
W:  apel.anu.edu.au 
A P E L - Your guide to the best economic and policy literature on the Asian-Pacific region 
 
 
‘…the beneficial effect of large shareholders can be expected only when the 
management is separated from ownership, or when proper corporate governance 
mechanisms are in place and operating so that outside shareholders can effectively 
oversee corporate management’. These conditions are generally not fulfilled in most 
Asian economies (Roche 2005). 
In these circumstances, firm disciplinary mechanisms are less likely to be able to remove 
poorly-performing insiders, given the entrenchment effect associated with higher insider 
ownership. Eventually, the absence of the threat of dismissal facilitates the family 
members serving on the board representing the interest of the family by transferring 
corporate resources to themselves, thereby curtailing firm performance. Therefore, we 
predict that the proportion of family members of controlling owners serving on the 
board is negatively related to firm performance. 
With regard to the derivation of the model to be tested, the following literature is noted. 
The model includes board size, firm’s age, and industry as control variables. Board size 
has been claimed as determining the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring role, with 
larger boards able to undertake a greater number and wider scope of monitoring duties 
(Yermack 1996). The firm’s age has a logical relationship with the firm’s size 
(Schellenger et al. 1989), whereby the influence of controlling shareholders over board 
member selection increases as firms grow larger (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). The type of 
industry reflects the nature of business, which potentially affects corporate performance 
(Barnhart et al. 1994). 
With regard to the expected sign of the relationship between independent directorship 
and firm performance, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that the negative 
  
Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 
ANU College of Asia & the Pacific                                          
The Australian National University                                         
JG Crawford Building No. 13                                                  
Canberra ACT 0200 Australia   
T:  +61 2 6125 0407      
F:  +61 2 6125 8448 
E:   apel@anu.edu.au 
W:  apel.anu.edu.au 
A P E L - Your guide to the best economic and policy literature on the Asian-Pacific region 
 
 
association might be driven by an endogenous effect of board appointment, whereby 
poorly-performing firms tend to appoint more independent directors to convince market 
participants that the company is aware of poor performance being associated with 
greater agency problems. Another plausible explanation is that the marginal cost of 
appointing additional outside directors outweighs the marginal benefit beyond a 
particular point (Bhagat and Black 2002). 
In respect of the relationship between family shareholding and performance, Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) documented better accounting performance associated with the 
concentrated ownership of Malaysian-listed firms. This is not consistent with the 
findings in this paper, as discussed in the results section. 
The issue of the type of measure of board composition has been addressed by 
researchers such as Rhoades et al (2000), Baysinger and Butler (1985), Block (1999), 
and Postma (1999). The last-mentioned addressed the linearity of the relationship. 
Börsch-Supan and Köke (2002) addressed the issue of endogeneity with regard to 
governance mechanisms and firm performance and this problem was studied by Seifert 
et al (2004) using a two-stage, least-squares regression approach. With respect to the 
board’s advisory and control roles, the work of Cotter and Silvester (2003) suggests a 
more rigorous approach to determining the relationship between independent directors 
and firm performance, based on Klein (1998). 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
We use various data sources namely: company annual reports (AR), the Indonesian 
Capital Market Directory (ICMD), the Profile of Publicly Listed Companies (PPLC), 
Prominent (PRO), and Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) list of independent directors. The 
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performance indicator was obtained from the ICMD database. To identify the 
controlling owners, we first refer to annual reports, which disclose the immediate 
owners. We then trace the immediate owners to the PPLC in order to identify the firm’s 
business group and the ultimate owners.
1
 Information on the boards of directors was 
gathered from annual reports, which stipulate the names and numbers of directors. The 
names of directors were traced to the JSX publication and PRO in order to identify the 
independent directors and the directors among controlling family members. Table 1 
provides a summary of the variables of interest and data sources. 
Table 1:  Measures and Data Sources of Variables of Interest 
 
Variables Acronym Measures Sources 
Return on Assets ROA The ratio of earnings before interest, 
extraordinary items, and taxes to total 
assets as of 2003. 
AR 
Independent 
directors 
IDP The ratio of the number of independent 
directors to the total number of directors. 
AR,  
JSX list 
Board Size BSIZE Total number of directors on the board of 
the company. 
AR 
Controlling family 
ownership 
FML The ratio of shares owned by the largest 
shareholder to total outstanding shares.  
AR, PRO 
PPLC,  
Directors of 
Controlling family  
 
FMBD The ratio of the number of family members 
of controlling owners serving on the 
board to total number of directors. 
AR, PRO 
PPLC,  
Age AGE 2003 minus the year of incorporation AR 
Industry IND 3-digit JSX industry classification ICMD 
 
The sample is based on all industrial firms listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) as 
at 31 December 2003. We excluded firms that had negative equity, those that were not 
present in all data sources, property and financial service firms, and observations that 
were outliers (more than three standard deviations from the mean). This sampling 
procedure gave a sample of 152 firms. 
                                                 
1
 In most cases, the ultimate owner had two names, the original Chinese name and an Indonesian name. 
For example, the ultimate owner of PT Indofood Sukses Makmur, Tbk is Liem Sioe Liong (Chinese 
name) alias Soedono Salim, (Indonesian name). 
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Firm performance is measured using Return on Assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of 
earnings before deduction of interest costs, extraordinary items, and taxes to total assets 
as of 2003. Consistent with the JSX, we define an independent director as an individual 
without any affiliation with management, other directors, controlling owners, and who 
does not serve as a commissioner in any other affiliated firm.
2
 The fraction of 
independent directors is defined as the ratio of independent directors to the total number 
of directors. Similarly, the fraction of the directors of the controlling family is defined as 
the ratio of the family members of the controlling owners on the board to the total 
number of directors. We aggregate the individual shareholdings of family members (by 
marriage and blood, both to second degree vertically and horizontally) of controlling 
owners to construct controlling family ownership. We define the controlling 
shareholders’ ownership by simply accumulating the cash-flow rights of their immediate 
ownership. We use a 20 per cent shareholding as a cut-off in differentiating between a 
dispersed firm and a family-controlled firm. 
We use the following model to analyse the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance. 
ROA it  =  α + ß1 IDPDIRit+ + ß2 FMLit + ß3 FMBDit  
   + ß4 BSIZE + ß5 AGEit + ß6  INDit +εit                   1) 
Where: 
IDPDIRit  : The fraction of independent directors of firm i at year t  
FMLit   : Controlling family ownership of firm i at year t  
                                                 
2
 See SE-03/PM/2000, Kep-315/BEJ/062000, and Kep-339/BEJ/07-2001 art C.2. 
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FMBDit : The proportion of family members of controlling owners serving on the     
board of firm i at year t 
BSIZEit : Board size of firm i at year t  
AGEit : Age of firm i at year t 
INDit  : Industry group of firm i at year t  
4. RESULTS 
4. 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables. The fraction 
of independent directors in 131 firms is 33 per cent or higher. This suggests that most 
Indonesian-listed firms have complied with the JSX regulation that the proportion of 
independent directors of listed firms should be at least one-third of the total number of 
directors. 
The average shareholding by domestic controlling owners is 58 per cent, confirming the 
prevalence of concentrated ownership of Indonesian firms.
3
 On average, the boards of 
directors are comprised of 31 per cent of controlling family members, indicating that a 
high degree of owners’ involvement in corporate control is a salient feature of 
Indonesian-listed firms. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N=152) 
 
 Descriptive Statistics Correlations 
  Min Max Mean SD IDP BSIZE  FML 
 
FMBD 
 
AGE 
 
IND 
                                                 
3
 In all cases, the immediate owner of the firm was another company of a particular business group 
owned by the same controlling owners. On some occasions, the firm was jointly owned by several 
families who formed a partnership to control the firm. However, this joint ownership is a floating 
rather than a permanent coalition. For example, Soedono Salim (Salim group) and Dick Gelael 
(Gelael group) formed a coalition to gain majority control of PT Fast Food Indonesia; while on 
another occasion Soedono Salim formed a partnership with Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Citra group, 
the oldest daughter of former president General Soeharto) and Jopie Widjaja (Infinity group) to 
control PT Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada. 
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IDP 0.00 0.67 0.37 0.11           
BSIZE 2.00 10.00 4.36 1.85 0.005          
FML 0.00 98.17 57.59 23.90 -0.075 -0.095         
FMBD 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.24 0.035 -0.308 *** 0.428 ***      
AGE 1.39 4.77 3.12 0.44 -0.050 0.067  -0.240 *** -0.099     
IND 1.00 35.00 17.32 10.22 0.004 0.004  0.103  0.004  -0.230 ***  
ROA -0.19 0.30 0.05 0.08 -0.122 0.133  -0.253 *** -0.324 *** 0.221 *** -0.102 
 
Note: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
Variable definitions are given in Table 1. 
 
The boards of Indonesian-listed firms range between two and ten directors, indicating 
that listed firms in Indonesia have met the regulation requiring publicly-listed 
corporations to appoint at least two directors.
4
 The mean age of firms is 26 years, 
suggesting that most firms have been incorporated since the mid-1970s.
5
 
The family members of controlling owners serving on the board (FMBD) has a positive 
association with controlling family ownership (FML), suggesting that family-controlled 
firms are more likely to have higher family involvement on boards. The fraction of 
family members of controlling owners serving on boards is negatively correlated with 
board size (BSIZE), indicating that the proportion of directors of the controlling family 
declines as boards grow larger. Firm age (AGE) is negatively correlated with family 
ownership, indicating that a higher level of ownership by a controlling family is more 
likely to be found in younger firms. Firm age is also positively correlated with industry 
classification (IND). 
4. 2. Multivariate Data Analysis 
Table 3 reports the results from the ordinary least-squares regression of ROA on board 
composition and family control. In specification 1 the fraction of independent directors 
                                                 
4
 Company Law 1995 art 94 (2) and articles 79 (2). 
5
 This is consistent with Husnan (2002) who notes that during this period, the government switched 
its development focus from agriculture to manufacturing through providing low interest rates and 
taxation incentives. As a result, new industries emerge in that period. 
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is a significant predictor of firm performance at the 10 per cent significance level. 
Contrary to our prediction, the sign of the outside director variable is negative, 
suggesting that a higher fraction of independent directors is associated with lower firm 
performance. Controlling family shareholding (FML) has a negative relationship with 
accounting performance at the one per cent level of significance, suggesting that firm 
performance is better with more diffused share ownership. This finding is not consistent 
with the work of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), for example, who documented a higher 
accounting performance in the concentrated ownership of Malaysian-listed firms. 
However, their research did not differentiate between controlling owners and unrelated 
large shareholders, which might confound their result. Board size (BSIZE) is 
insignificantly related to firm performance. 
Specification 2 indicates that controlling family involvement on the board (FMBD) is 
negatively related to a firm’s performance. This relationship is significant at the one per 
cent level, which indicates that controlling family involvement on the board is more 
likely to create an entrenchment effect, rather than an alignment effect, and therefore 
exacerbates agency problems. The relationship between independent directors and firm 
performance becomes insignificant. 
Specification 3 suggests that controlling family involvement on the board is negatively 
related to firm performance. In the presence of such involvement, the impacts of 
independent directors and controlling family ownership on firm performance become 
insignificant. This finding indicates that controlling family involvement on the board is a 
consistent predictor of firm performance and implies that controlling family ownership 
is more detrimental to firm performance whenever the controlling owners are involved 
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in board decisions. As controlling family ownership is positively associated with 
controlling family involvement on boards, this finding suggests that excessive control-
enhancing mechanisms are detrimental to firm performance. 
 
Table 3: Cross-sectional OLS Regression of ROA on Board Composition, Controlling 
Family Shareholding, and Controlling Family Involvement on the Board (N=152) 
 
 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
(Constant) 0.028 
 
0.011 
 
0.041 
 
 (0.459) 
 
(0.200) 
 
(0.675) 
 
IDP -0.096 
* -0.076 
 
-0.084 
 
 (-1.684) 
 (-1.358) 
 
(-1.499) 
 
FML -0.001 
*** - 
 
0.000 
 
 (-2.649) 
 - 
 
(-1.288) 
 
FMBD - 
 
-0.098 
*** 
-0.082 
*** 
 - 
 
(-3.650) 
 
(-2.775) 
 
BSIZE 0.004 
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
 
 (1.326) 
 
(0.401) 
 
(0.470) 
 
AGE 0.026 
 
0.031 
** 
0.027 
** 
 (1.768) 
 
(2.162) 
 
(1.851) 
 
IND 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 (-0.585) 
 
(-0.787) 
 
(-0.705) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Ajd-R2 0.091 
 
0.127 
 
0.131 
 
F 4.010 
 
5.379 
 
4.780 
 
 
Note: t-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 
per cent level, respectively. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. 
 
4. 3. Sensitivity Analysis 
It has been argued that the way in which board composition is measured affects testing 
of the association between board composition and firm performance (for example, 
Rhoades et al. 2000). To address this issue, the study ran an OLS regression using a 
different measure of independent directors’ representation, where the value of 
independent directors is zero if the boards consists of less than 30 per cent independent 
directors, one if the proportion of independent directors ranges from 30 per cent to 40 
per cent, and two if the board comprises more than 40 per cent independent directors. It 
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is claimed that this measure better reflects differences in board representation (for 
example, Baysinger and Butler, 1985). The results are presented in Table 4, specification 
1. The representation of independent directors remains insignificantly related to firm 
performance, suggesting that the insignificant association is robust to alternative 
measures of board composition. 
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Table 4: Cross-sectional OLS and 2SLS Regressions of ROA on Board Composition, 
Controlling Family Shareholding and Controlling Family Involvement on Boards 
(N=152) 
 
 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
(Constant) 0.021 
 
0.036 
 
0.030 
 
0.315 
* 0.056 
 
 (0.351) 
 
(0.539) 
 
(0.438) 
 
(1.83) 
 (0.633) 
 
IDP - 
 
- 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.438 
 
-0.068 
 
 - 
 
- 
 
(-0.044) 
 
(-1.018) 
 
(-1.204) 
 
IDPRANK -0.007 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 (-0.758) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
BD30 - 
 
-0.005 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 - 
 
(-0.438) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
BD3050 - 
 
0.102 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 - 
 
(0.584) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
D50 - 
 
-0.032 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 - 
 
(-1.367) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
IDP
2
 - 
 
- 
 
-0.102 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 - 
 
- 
 
(-0.386) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
FML 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 (-1.144) 
 
(-1.384) 
 
(-1.273) 
 
(0.238) 
 
(-1.440) 
 
FMBD -0.085 
*** 
-0.082 
*** 
-0.083 
*** 
-0.318 
** 
-0.084 
*** 
 (-2.862) 
 
(-2.729) 
 
(-2.792) 
 
(-2.399) 
 
(-2.860) 
 
AUD - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.013 
 
 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(-0.790) 
 
LEAD - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.002 
 
 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(0.215) 
 
BSIZE 0.002 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-0.005 
 
0.002 
 
 (0.437) 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.404) 
 
(-0.606) 
 
(0.639) 
 
AGE 0.028 
* 
0.025 
* 
0.026 
* -  0.029 
*** 
 (1.918) 
 
(1.730) 
 
(1.823) 
 -  (2.032) 
 
IND 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
- 
 
0.000 
 
 (-0.734) 
 
(-0.570) 
 
(-0.634) 
 
- 
 
(-0.664) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ajd-R2 0.121 
 
0.127 
 
0.125 
 
0.098 
 
0.139 
 
F 4.451 
 
3.747 
 
4.094 
 
5.637 
 
4.059 
 
 
Note: t-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 
per cent levels, respectively. 
 
In two of three specifications, the fraction of independent directors is found to have an 
insignificant relationship with firm performance. Block (1999) argues that this pattern 
might be driven by a non-linear relationship. The study follows two approaches to 
capture the possibility of non-linear relationships between the proportion of independent 
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directors and firm performance. The first uses piece-wise linear regressions, which allow 
for two changes in the slope coefficient on board composition using the following 
variables. 
 
BD30 =  proportion of outside directors if the proportion of independent directors <30% 
=  30% if the proportion of independent directors ≥ 30% 
BD30-50 =  0 if the proportion of independent directors <30% 
= proportion of independent directors minus 30% if 30% ≤ proportion of independent 
directors <50% 
=  20% if the proportion of independent directors ≥ 50% 
BD50 =  0 if the proportion of independent directors <50% 
=  proportion of independent directors minus 50% if the proportion of independent 
directors ≥ 50% 
 
Second, following Postma (1999), the study employs a quadratic representation of board 
composition. Table 4, specifications 2 and 3 report the OLS regressions linking board 
composition to firm performance using the piece-wise method and the quadratic, 
respectively. In all specifications, the independent directors are insignificantly related to 
firm performance. 
The relationship between the governance mechanism and firm performance might suffer 
an endogeneity problem, leading to a biased result (see Börsch-Supan and Köke 2002). 
Following Seifert et al (2004), the study uses the 2SLS regression technique to address 
this issue (Table 4, specification 4). The dependent variable is ROA 2003 and the 
instrumental variables are the proportion of independent directors, the fraction of family 
directors, controlling family shareholdings, and firm performance in 2001 (lag-2). 
Consistent with the results from the OLS analyses, the independent directors and board 
size variables are insignificantly related to firm performance in all specifications. This 
finding indicates that the proportion of outside directors is not endogenously determined 
by prior poor performance. The involvement of controlling families on boards remains 
significantly related to firm performance, suggesting that such involvement discourages 
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firm performance and not vice versa. Controlling family ownership becomes an 
insignificant predictor of firm performance, indicating that the association between this 
variable and firm performance is moderated by the presence of a control-enhancing 
mechanism. 
A board’s advisory and control roles as reflected in board committees may be used as a 
proxy for the specific duties of the board. The formation of committees ‘...represents a 
mechanism for companies to organise their boards’ in promoting the overall 
effectiveness of boards (Cotter and Silvester 2003:211). Accordingly, a more rigorous 
approach to investigating the association between independent directors and firm 
performance could be by focusing on the presence of such directors in the monitoring 
committee (see Klein 1998). By relating a particular committee with a specific outcome, 
this approach could deliver a clearer test of the association between the effectiveness of 
independent director monitoring and organisational outcomes. 
To test this proposition, Table 5, specification 5 presents the results of OLS regressions 
linking the representation of independent directors on audit committees. The AUD 
variable is the proportion of independent directors to the total number of directors 
serving on the audit committee. The LEAD variable is the leadership structure of the 
audit committee, which takes a value of zero if the independent directors serve as 
chairperson and one otherwise. The results show that none of the committee variables 
are significantly related to firm performance, suggesting that the insignificant 
relationship between independent directors and firm performance is robust after 
controlling for board committee structure. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The World Bank (2005) finds a lack of institutional reform that might prevent firms 
from appointing ‘truly’ independent directors. Specifically, this work finds an absence 
of nominating committees that would enable management, which represents the interests 
of the controlling family, to nominate the directors. The study also reports that the 
common voting method for the appointment of directors follows the slate system. The 
inappropriate nomination and voting systems leave minority shareholders with ‘…no 
alternative other than to approve the whole package’ proposed by the majority 
shareholders (World Bank 2005:7). This arrangement provides majority shareholders 
with the ability to control the board and facilitates them nominating individuals who are 
less likely to challenge the private benefits they derive from control. Accordingly, a 
system of appointment that properly accommodates the interests of non-controlling 
owners is needed in order to reduce majority control over appointments. This might be 
achieved through adopting a cumulative voting system and establishing a nomination 
committee. 
Indonesian-listed firms are characterised by ownership concentration in the hands of 
controlling families and controlling family involvement in the boards. This study reveals 
that family ownership concentration is negatively related to firm performance. The 
involvement of a controlling family on the board is also found to have a negative 
relationship with firm performance. This suggests that family members share common 
interests and that they act collectively, which suggests that a check and balance system 
will not work effectively. Consequently, corporate governance that separates 
management decisions from control decisions should be encouraged. 
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Several caveats are in order. First, this study uses accounting numbers as a proxy of firm 
performance. It could be the case that Indonesian-listed firms inflate their earning 
statements. This may be partly attributable to the ownership structure. However, the 
study does not address this issue. Second, the study treated independent directors 
equally, irrespective of their nomination and appointment processes; which might create 
a bias in the results, since independent directors nominated by management or 
controlling owners could have a different impact from independent directors who are 
nominated by minority shareholders. 
Third, the study relied on measures of the immediate ownership of the controlling 
family. This meant that voting rights and cash flow rights were not distinguished. Morck 
and Yeung (2003), for example, argue that expropriation is more pervasive in firms with 
divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights and firms that are a part of 
business groups. 
6. CONCLUSION 
We find that the share of independent directors on boards of family-controlled 
companies has an insignificant relationship with firm performance in Indonesia. The 
suspicion is that the result is driven by the lack of institutional reforms in relation to the 
appointment of independent directors. The analysis reveals strong empirical support for 
the proposition that family control is negatively related to firm performance. But the 
effect of family ownership disappears when family involvement on the board is taken 
into the model. This result suggests that family ownership is more detrimental to firm 
performance when the family is highly involved in control decisions. Our results suggest 
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that Indonesia should implement governance reforms that would have the effect of 
preventing majority owners from exercising excessive control. 
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